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Abstract
We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for
fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bon-
dareva (1963) and Shapley (1967).
First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse situations where
the fuzzy game is continuous. Our main result shows that any fuzzy
game has a non-empty core if and only if it satisﬁes all (fuzzy) balanced
inequalities.
We also consider deposit games to illustrate the use of the main result.
JEL classiﬁcation: C71
Keywords: Cooperative fuzzy games, fuzzy balancedness, fuzzy core
1 Introduction
In a standard cooperative game, if players choose to combine eﬀorts, then they
form a coalition. If a player is in a coalition, he is assumed to put in his maximal
eﬀort. However, in certain settings it makes sense to consider partial cooperation
of players. For instance, if the participation of a player is dependent only on
money or time, it makes sense to consider situations where diﬀerent levels of
participation of a player are considered. Consider for example deposit games as
analysed in Van Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010). There
players have an endowment that they can use to (jointly) deposit at a bank. It
is possible for players to commit only a part of their endowment to a coalition.
Fuzzy games are used to study the situations where the endowment (or in general
the participation level) of each player is assumed to be inﬁnitely divisible. We
think this assumption is reasonable when we consider the amount of capital
each player has available, such as endowments in deposit games.
Cooperative fuzzy games were introduced by Aubin (1974) (French) and
Aubin (1981) (English). For an overview of work on fuzzy games, we refer to
Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2005). The literature mainly focusses on extending
situations corresponding to cooperative games to fuzzy settings. We also provide
such an extension in this paper: fuzzy deposit games. We use this extension
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1to illustrate our main result: generalising the result by Bondareva (1963) and
Shapley (1967) that the core of a cooperative game is non-empty if and only if
the game is balanced.
The natural extension of the core of a game is the fuzzy core of the fuzzy
game: no fuzzy coalition has any incentive to split oﬀ from the grand coalition.
The fuzzy core is deﬁned by Tijs, Branzei, Ishihara, and Muto (2004) and is
studied for convex fuzzy games by Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2003).1 It is not
so clear what the natural extension of balancedness is in a fuzzy setting. This
is the ﬁrst question we address in this paper, and in section 2 in particular. We
ﬁnd that restricting fuzzy games to be continuous helps us ﬁnd the appropriate
form of the balanced inequalities that need to be satisﬁed for these games to have
a non-empty core. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that this approach using continuous
fuzzy games provides us with insight about the nature of fuzzy games and fuzzy
balancedness.
The second question we address provides an explicit link between the fuzzy
core and these balanced inequalities. The main result of this work is a small
extension of simultaneous work by Azrieli and Lehrer (2007), who need these
results in their study of market games. Because we use a diﬀerent proof, we
are able to omit one condition that Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) impose: that the
fuzzy game is assumed to be bounded.
This paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst introduce some notation in
section 2. We proceed in section 3, where we focus on continuous fuzzy games.
We show all continuous fuzzy games with a non-empty core satisfy all balanced
inequalities as introduced for fuzzy games in section 2, and vice versa. In section
4, we use the insights of continuous fuzzy games, and extend the result to all
fuzzy games with a non-empty core. We apply the results of this paper in
section 5, where we consider an extension of the term dependent deposit games
introduced in Van Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010). By
making the endowment of each coalition depend on the level of participation
of the players, we construct term dependent fuzzy deposit games. Using the
relation between balanced inequalities and the fuzzy core, we show that the
core of these games is always non-empty. We conclude in section 6.
2 Notation
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce some notation used throughout this paper.
We denote the set of all players N = {1,2,...,n} and S ⊆ N is refered to as
a coalition. A regular cooperative game is a function w : 2N → R, with the
convention that w(∅) = 0.
















1An extension of the core called the fuzzy core has also been discussed by Butnariu (1980),




In a fuzzy game, we express fuzzy coalitions as a combination of the partic-
ipation levels of all players, i.e. s ∈ [0,1]N is a fuzzy coalition. A fuzzy game is
denoted (N,v) where v : [0,1]N → R, again with the convention that v(0) = 0.
We deﬁne eS ∈ [0,1]N for all S ⊆ N by eS
i = 1 if i ∈ S and eS
i = 0 if i 6∈ S. For
all S ⊆ N we interpret eS as the fuzzy coalition corresponding to coalition S
in a regular cooperative game. For a fuzzy singleton coalition i ∈ N we denote
ei = e{i}, and for the fuzzy grand coalition we denote eN. The fuzzy core is
deﬁned similar to the regular core.

















In this paper, we analyse the relation between the fuzzy core and balanced
inequalities. We ﬁrst deﬁne a balanced collection.
Deﬁnition 3 A ﬁnite collection of fuzzy coalitions B ⊂ [0,1]N is balanced if
for every s ∈ B there exists a weight λs > 0 such that
X
s∈B
λssi = 1, (1)
for all i ∈ N.
Observe that this is a generalisation of the notion of balanced collections used for
regular cooperative games (see, i.e. Shapley (1967)). Now we deﬁne a balanced
inequality.
Deﬁnition 4 The balanced inequality corresponding to a balanced collection B






s∈B λsv(s) is denoted as L(B,λ,v).
We also deﬁne the concept of continuity for fuzzy games.
Deﬁnition 5 A fuzzy game (N,v) is continuous if v : [0,1]N → R is a contin-
uous function.
33 Continuous fuzzy games
This section focusses on continuous fuzzy games, and the relation in these games
between non-emptiness of the fuzzy core and balanced inequalities. We intro-
duce limited fuzzy games, which are restricted to coalitions for which s ∈ QN.
These games can be seen as a restriction of the fuzzy game to a ﬁnite number
of coalitions.
It is apparent that this approach needs continuous fuzzy games in order to
be viable. Only by assuming continuity for the fuzzy game v, it is true that the
values of v for fuzzy coalitions in QN fully determine the values of v on the full
domain [0,1]N. We speciﬁcally use that all balanced inequalities of limited fuzzy
games provide information about the value of the coalitions in QN, and hence,
by continuity, also for all coalitions. The latter is not true in general for non-
continuous fuzzy games, and therefore we take a diﬀerent approach in the next
section. This section however highlights this interesting technique described
above that is more insightful than the general approach. Another contribution
of this section, is that it sheds light on the deﬁnition of balanced inequalities, as
in Deﬁnition 4. In particular, one might wonder why in fuzzy games balanced
inequalities are expressed as ﬁnite sums, rather than as integrals.
First, let us give a formal deﬁnition of a limited fuzzy game.
Deﬁnition 6 Let k ∈ N. Deﬁne Sk = {0, 1
k, 2
k,...,1}N. A k-limited fuzzy
game with set of players N is a function v : Sk → R where v(0) = 0. We have
that RSk is the collection of all k-limited fuzzy games.
Rather than considering inﬁnitely many coalitions, the number of coalitions in a
k-limited fuzzy game is ﬁnite. We refer to Sk as a grid. Observe that a 1-limited
fuzzy game is in fact a standard cooperative game with coalitions S ⊆ N. We
also introduce terminology if the k-limited fuzzy games are restrictions of a
fuzzy game.
Deﬁnition 7 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game and let k ∈ N. Its k-limited restriction
is the k-limited fuzzy game vk : Sk → R deﬁned by vk(s) = v(s) for all s ∈ Sk.
This k-limited fuzzy game can be seen as the fuzzy game (N,v), but restricted
on a grid which depends on k. For a k-limited fuzzy game, the natural extension
of the fuzzy core is simply to restrict the core conditions to fuzzy coalitions in
Sk.
Deﬁnition 8 Let k ∈ N and v : Sk → R a k-limited fuzzy game. The k-core of














Note that FCore1(v) = Core(v) for 1-limited fuzzy games v (which are of
course standard cooperative games). It is also straightforward how to extend
the notion of additivity to a k-limited fuzzy game.
4Deﬁnition 9 Let k ∈ N. A k-limited fuzzy game v is additive if there exists
an a ∈ RN such that for all s ∈ Sk it holds that v(s) =
P
i∈N siai.
Note that all (fuzzy) additive k-limited games have a non-empty (fuzzy) k-core,
and that a is the single element in that (fuzzy) k-core.
Our aim is to show that there exist balancedness conditions that, when
satisﬁed, ensure that the k-core of the k-limited fuzzy game is non-empty. We
show moreover that there are (linear) conditions that are satisﬁed by all k-
limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core. First, we show that the class of
all k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core is a closed convex cone. The
following lemma is a ﬁrst step in that direction.
Lemma 10 Let k ∈ N. Every convergent sequence of k-limited fuzzy games
with a non-empty k-core converges to a k-limited fuzzy game with a non-empty
k-core.
Proof: Let v1,v2,... be a convergent sequence of k-limited fuzzy games with
a non-empty k-core, and let x1,x2,... be core elements for these games. For all




Let i ∈ N. As v(ei) = limn→∞ vn(ei), the sequence v1(ei),v2(ei),... is
bounded, so there is a number di such that vn(ei) ≥ di for all n ∈ N. Similarly,
because v(eN) = limn→∞ vn(eN), the sequence v1(eN),v2(eN),... is bounded,
so there is a number u such that vn(eN) ≤ u for all n ∈ N. So,
di ≤ vn(ei) ≤ xn








for every n ∈ N.
So x1,x2,... is bounded. According to Bolzano-Weierstrass, there is a con-
verging subsequence xm1,xm2,... of core elements in RN for some of these















so x is a core element of v. ￿
The next step is to show that the class of all k-limited fuzzy games with a
non-empty k-core is a convex cone.
Theorem 11 Let k ∈ N. Let v,w be k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty
k-core and α > 0. Then v + w and α · v are k-limited fuzzy games with a non-
empty k-core. So, all k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core form a
convex cone.
5Proof: Let xv,xw core allocations of the games v and w. Deﬁne xv+w =

















N) = (v + w)(e
N).
Hence v + w has a non-empty k-core. Also for all s ∈ Sk we have
α · xv
s ≥ α · v(s) = (α · v)(s),
and
α · xv
eN = α · v(eN) = (α · v)(eN).
So α · v has a non-empty k-core. ￿
Lemma 10 implies that this convex cone is in fact closed.
Next, we deﬁne a class of linear forms and inequalities that is more general
than the class of balanced inequalities. We show that the closed convex cone of
all k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core can be deﬁned using these
inequalities. Later, we reﬁne this class of inequalities.
Deﬁnition 12 Let k ∈ N. A linear k-form is a linear function L : RSk → R.





for all v ∈ RSk. A linear k-form is prebalanced if it vanishes for additive
functions v, and the corresponding inequality
L(v) ≤ 0
is called a prebalanced inequality.
Note that every balanced inequality is also a prebalanced inequality. A link
with k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core is provided below.
Lemma 13 Let k ∈ N and let L be a linear k-form such that L(v) ≤ 0 for all k-
limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core. Then L is necessarily prebalanced.
Proof: Let a be an additive game. Then −a is an additive game as well. Hence
a and −a both have a non-empty k-core. So, L(a) ≤ 0 and −L(a) = L(−a) ≤ 0.
Hence L(a) = 0. ￿
In fact, the relation between k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core
and these prebalanced inequalities is more speciﬁc, as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 14 Let k ∈ N. The set of k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty
k-core can be deﬁned by a system of prebalanced inequalities.
6Proof: A closed convex cone is the intersection of the closed half-spaces that
contain it. Half-spaces are deﬁned by a linear inequality, and for the set of k-
limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core these are necessarily prebalanced
by Lemma 13. ￿
We are able to be more particular about the form of the prebalanced in-
equalities in Lemma 14.
Theorem 15 Let k ∈ N. A k-limited fuzzy game has a non-empty k-core if, and
only if, it satisﬁes all balanced inequalities corresponding to a balanced collection
B ⊆ Sk.
Proof: The deﬁning inequalities of a k-limited fuzzy game has a non-empty




γs · v(s) ≤ 0,
by such a prebalanced inequality. Consider a k-limited fuzzy game v with a
non-empty k-core. Then by decreasing the value of any coalition s ∈ Sk where
s 6= eN, the game still has a non-empty k-core. So this coalition must have
a non-negative coeﬃcient γ. By increasing the value of coalition eN the game
remains to have a non-empty k-core. So γeN is non-positive. If γeN = 0, then
γs = 0 for all s ∈ Sk, because a linear k-form vanishes for additive functions.




s · v(s) ≤ v(eN),
where γ0
s ≥ 0 is obtained from dividing γs by −γeN for all s ∈ Sk\{eN}. Be-
cause a linear k-form vanishes for additive functions, this prebalanced inequality
corresponds to a balanced inequality if we deﬁne




It remains to show that all k-limited fuzzy games with a non-empty k-core
satisfy all balanced inequalities. Take such a game v, with core element x.
Then we make an additive game x0 with value xi for all i ∈ N. Let B ⊆ Sk. By




where λs > 0 for all s ∈ B. From the fact that for all s ∈ Sk we have x0(s) ≥ v(s)




7where λs > 0 for all s ∈ B, which completes the proof. ￿
We are now able to present a partial result of the relationship between bal-
anced inequalities and the fuzzy core.
Theorem 16 A continuous fuzzy game (N,v) has a non-empty core if, and
only if, every k-limited fuzzy game of v has a non-empty k-core.
Proof: Let (N,v) be a continuous fuzzy game, and let x be a core element of
(N,v). Then for all k ∈ N and s ∈ Sk we have
xs ≥ v(s) = vk(s),
and also
xeN = v(eN) = vk(eN),
so x is also a core element for every k-limited fuzzy game of v.
















So x1,x2,... is bounded. According to Bolzano-Weierstrass there exists at least
one subsequence that converges. Let xk1,xk2,... be such a subsequence and
deﬁne x = limn→∞ xkn. We now show that x ∈ FCore(v).




kn for all n ∈ N and all i ∈ N. It is clear
that skn ∈ Skn. We have that |si − s
kn
i | ≤ 1















































so x ∈ FCore(v). ￿
As a corollary of Theorem 15, Theorem 16 and continuity in general, the main
result of this section follows.
8Theorem 17 A continuous fuzzy game has a non-empty core if, and only if, it
satisﬁes all balanced inequalities.
This result is generalised in the next section.
4 Main result
In this section, we generalise the result of section 3 to the class of all fuzzy games
with a non-empty core. We start this section with a visual representation of the
method we use to derive this result. In Figure 1 the graph of a fuzzy game (N,v)
is depicted, where N = {1,2} and v(s) = (s1 + 2s2)2. This fuzzy game (N,v)
satisﬁes all balancedness conditions. For this fuzzy game we ﬁnd a function
f that provides an upper bound for the value of each coalition, such that all
balanced inequalities hold. The intuition is that f(s) also gives information
about v(eN −s), because s and eN −s together form a balanced collection. The
graph of f is depicted in Figure 2. We show that there exists a linear function g
that separates f and v2. The plane corresponding to g is graphically represented
in Figure 3. Because the graph of this function includes (eN,v(eN)), it gives
rise to an element of the fuzzy core. In Figure 4 we have highlighted the graphs
of the functions v, f and g on the diagonal from e1 to e2. The core element of
(N,v) that g gives rise to can be readily seen in Figure 4, since for any player
i ∈ N we only need to look at the value of g in ei. In this case, the function g
gives rise to x = (3,6), and it can be veriﬁed that indeed x ∈ FCore(v).
Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions, where N
is the set of players {1,2,...,n} and v : [0,1]N → R its characteristic function.
We deﬁne the set of values a coalition s ∈ [0,1]N can attain without violating a
balancedness condition in which this coalition is involved, given all other values
in this balancedness condition remain unchanged, by
M(s) =

     













∃k ∈ N, s1,s2,...,sk ∈ [0,1]N,






     
     
Every balancedness condition that includes coalition s provides a value in M(s).
Lemma 18 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
The set M(s) is non-empty for all s ∈ [0,1]N.
Proof: Let s ∈ [0,1]N, k = λ0 = λ1 = 1, and s1 = eN − s ∈ [0,1]N. We ﬁnd
that v(eN) − v(eN − s) ∈ M(s), so M(s) is non-empty. ￿
We deﬁne a function f : [0,1]N → R that is an upper bound for the value each
coalition in N can attain without violating any balancedness condition, given













Figure 1: The graph of v(s) = (s1 + 2s2)2.
the values of all other coalitions remain the same, by
f(s) = inf M(s). (2)
First, we have to show that this function f is well-deﬁned.
Lemma 19 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
The function f in equation (2) is well-deﬁned. Furthermore f(s) ≥ v(s) for all
s ∈ [0,1]N.
Proof: Let s ∈ [0,1]N. We show that M(s) has lower bound v(s). Any non-
empty set that has a lower bound has an inﬁmum, thus f(s) is well-deﬁned.
Also, this lower bound is then a lower bound for f(s) as well, so v(s) ≤ f(s).


















Figure 2: The extension of Figure 1 with the graph of f.







proving there is a lower bound. ￿
Next, we show that on the diagonal from 0 to eN, f is linear, and furthermore
that the values of f and v are equal in 0 and eN. Note that consequently for
any aﬃne function g that separates f and v, the values on this diagonal are
equal to those of f as a result. It is readily observed that if g is linear as well,
an eﬃcient allocation for v can be derived from g.
Lemma 20 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.


















Figure 3: The extension of Figure 2 with the graph of g.
Proof: Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Let k = λ0 = 1, λ1 = 1 − α, s = αeN and s1 = eN.
This corresponds to a balancedness condition, since obviously
λ0s + λ1s1 = αeN + (1 − α)eN = eN.
Hence,
v(eN) − (1 − α)v(eN)
1
= αv(eN) ∈ M(αeN).
So f(αeN) = inf M(αeN) ≤ αv(eN).
If α = 1, it follows from the above inequality combined with Lemma 19 that
v(eN) ≤ f(eN) ≤ v(eN), hence f(eN) = v(eN). We now consider the case when












b x1 = 3
b 5
b 4
b 6 = x2
b 8
Figure 4: Crossection of Figure 3 along the diagonal from e1 to e2, including







We can rewrite equation (3) to
k X
j=1
λjsj = (1 − λ0α)eN,


















So every element of M(eN) is bounded from below by αv(eN). It follows that
f(αeN) ≥ αv(eN). Hence f(αeN) = αv(eN) = αf(eN). ￿
It follows that f(0) = 0 · v(eN) = v(0).
We now proceed to show that the function f is convex. It follows that there
exists a hyperplane ‘below’ the graph of f.
Lemma 21 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
The function f deﬁned in equation (2) is convex.
13Proof: Let s,t ∈ [0,1]N and α ∈ (0,1). We show that
f(αs + (1 − α)t) ≤ αf(s) + (1 − α)f(t).
For this, we show that any two balanced inequalities, one containing s and the
other containing t, give rise to a balanced inequality containing αs + (1 − α)t.
We ﬁnd an upper bound for these inequalities, hence the inﬁmum of all balanced
inequalities containing αs +(1−α)t must have a smaller value than this upper
bound.
Let ε > 0. There exist numbers k,` ∈ N, weights λ0,...,λk,µ0,...,µ` > 0











< f(t) + ε.











< αf(s) + (1 − α)f(t) + ε. (4)












by combining the two underlying balanced inequalities to one containing u. Let
m ∈ N, η0,η1,...,ηm ∈ [0,1]N and u1,u2,...,um be deﬁned by
m = k + `,
η0 =
λ0µ0




αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0
λi, for all i ∈ {1,...,k},
ηi =
(1 − α)λ0
αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0
µi−k, for all i ∈ {k + 1,...,k + `},
u
i = s
i, for all i ∈ {1,...,k},
ui = ti−k, for all i ∈ {k + 1,...,k + `}.
14We ﬁnd that






αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0




































αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0
eN +
(1 − α)λ0
αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0
eN
= eN,
























(αµ0 + (1 − α)λ0)v(eN) − αµ0
Pk

























Because f(αs + (1 − α)t) = f(u) = inf M(u), we ﬁnd that











So, according to equation (4) we have
f(αs + (1 − α)t) < αf(s) + (1 − α)f(t) + ε.
15This inequality holds for all ε > 0, so we ﬁnd
f(αs + (1 − α)t) ≤ αf(s) + (1 − α)f(t),
which completes the proof that f is a convex function. ￿
Because f is convex, there exists a hyperplane with the graph of f on one side.
We later show that this hyperplane can be chosen such that the graph of v is
on the other side. We need the next theorem to show this.
Theorem 22 (Supporting Hyperplane Theorem) (Rockafellar (1970),
page 100) Let C be a convex set, and let D be a non-empty convex subset of C
(for instance, a subset consisting of a single point). In order that there exists a
non-trivial hyperplane to C containing D, it is necessary and suﬃcient that D
be disjoint from the relative interior of C.
In this case, we can take the set C = {(s,x)|x ∈ R,s ∈ [0,1]N : f(s) ≤ x}.
This set is obviously convex, because the function f is convex. Then D =
{(1
2eN,f(1
2eN))} is obviously on the boundary of this set, so it is a non-empty
convex subset of C, and disjoint from the relative interior of C. So, there exists
a hyperplane that contains D = {(1
2eN,f(1
2eN))}, and C is contained entirely
in one of the two half-spaces of the hyperplane. We consider this hyperplane
as the graph of the aﬃne function g : [0,1]N → R. Because the function f is
convex, we know that the graph of the function f is in the upper half-space.
Corollary 23 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness condi-
tions. Let f be the function deﬁned in equation (2), and let g be the hyperplane
to C containing D. It holds that g(s) ≤ f(s) for all s ∈ [0,1]N.
Furthermore, we can now show that the function g is linear.
Lemma 24 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
Let f be the function deﬁned in equation (2). Let g be the aﬃne function for
which the graph is the hyperplane to C containing D. The function g is linear.
Proof: Since g is an aﬃne function, and g(s) ≤ f(s) for all s ∈ [0,1]N, it holds
that
αg(eN) + (1 − α)g(0) = g(αeN) ≤ f(αeN) = αf(eN),
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. By choosing α = 0, we see that g(0) ≤ 0. By choosing α = 1
2,
equality holds by our deﬁnition of g and thus we see that g(eN)+g(0) = f(eN).
Because we know g(eN) ≤ f(eN), it follows that g(0) ≥ 0. Thus g(0) = 0, so g
is linear. ￿







eN) = f(eN) = v(eN).
We now show that while f is in one of the half-spaces of g, v is in the other
half-space. This result might seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, because f is an
16upper bound for v, and one can imagine the values of v being equal to this
upper bound, in which case v cannot be in the other half-space. We are able to
show that g in fact does separate f and v. The intuition behind this result is that
for any coalition t we have that v(t)+v(eN −t) ≤ v(eN) is a balanced inequality,
and thus satisﬁed by v. Let a be an aﬃne function such that a(t) = v(t) and
a(1
2eN) = v(1
2eN). It follows that also a(eN) = v(eN). Then v(t) = a(t) ≤ f(t),
and it follows that v(eN − t) ≤ v(eN) − v(t) = a(eN) − a(t) = a(eN − t). Thus
v(eN − t) is on the same side of the hyperplane associated with a as v(t). The
key in the next proof is that the function g is similar to the aﬃne function a.
Lemma 25 Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
Let f be the function deﬁned in equation (2). Let g be the aﬃne function for
which the graph is the hyperplane to C containing D. It holds that g(s) ≥ v(s)
for all s ∈ [0,1]N.
Proof: Let t ∈ [0,1]N be such that it holds that g(t) < v(t). Let s = eN − t,
k = λ0 = λ1 = 1 and s1 = t. Then λ0s + λ1s1 = s + t = eN − t + t = eN, so
v(eN) − λ1v(s1)
λ0
= v(eN) − v(t) ∈ M(s).
Then we ﬁnd that
f(s) = inf M(s) ≤ v(eN) − v(t)
< v(eN) − g(t) = g(eN) − g(t) = g(eN − t)
= g(s).
However, because we chose g such that g(u) ≤ f(u) for all u ∈ [0,1]N, we arrive
at a contradiction with Corollary 23, and thus a t such that g(t) < v(t) cannot
exist. ￿
We have shown that indeed g is a linear function that separates f and v.
Furthermore, we have that g(eN) = v(eN). Hence, g gives rise to an eﬃcient
allocation in the fuzzy core of v.
Theorem 26 A fuzzy game (N,v) that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions has
a non-empty fuzzy core.
Proof: Let (N,v) be a game that satisﬁes all balancedness conditions. Then
there exists an aﬃne g such that g(eN) = v(eN), and g(s) ≥ v(s) for all s ∈
[0,1]N. Because g is a linear function, (N,g) is an additive game. Deﬁne






g(ei) = g(eN) = v(eN),









g(siei) = g(s) ≥ v(s).
17Hence x is in the fuzzy core of the game (N,v). ￿
The relationship is even stronger than stated in Theorem 26.
Theorem 27 A fuzzy game (N,v) has a non-empty fuzzy core if, and only if,
it satisﬁes all balancedness conditions.
Proof: Theorem 26 already implies one part of this theorem. We only show
the remaining part. Let (N,v) be a fuzzy game with a non-empty fuzzy core,
and let x be in the fuzzy core of this game. Let k ∈ N, λ1,...,λk > 0 and

































so the balancedness condition holds. ￿
In the next section we provide an example of how this result can be applied
in (an extension of) deposit games.
5 Fuzzy deposit games
In this section, we illustrate the use of Theorem 27 to show that a fuzzy game
has a non-empty core. For this, we extend the deposit games from Van Gulick,
Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010). In that paper, two ways to show
that the core is non-empty are highlighted. In capital dependent deposit game a
core element is constructed, while we show that term dependent deposit games
satisfy all balancedness conditions. We were unable to ﬁnd a core element of
term dependent deposit games in general, a task that is made even harder when
the fuzzy core is considered, because the fuzzy core is even more restrictive.
Therefore, a proper extension of term dependent deposit games to fuzzy games
is a candidate to illustrate the usefulness of Theorem 27.
In a deposit situation as analysed in Van Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and
Hendrickx (2010), players can combine their endowments, m(i) ∈ R+ for i ∈ N,
in order to invest in deposits. Recall that N is the set of players. Capital is
deposited for a ﬁxed amount of time, called the term of the deposit:
T = {t1,t1 + 1,...,t2}.
Then T is the set of all possible terms of a deposit between 1 and τ. Here




δ ∈ Rτ+1 |∃c > 0,T ∈ T : δ = c · h(T)
￿
,
18where we deﬁne the function h : T → Rτ+1 as a deposit of 1 unit of capital over
term T ∈ T . Note that because these deﬁnitions do not depend on m(i) at all,
they are all still applicable to the situition where the participation level of the
players is allowed to vary, i.e. they only invest part of their endowment. We
later emphasise where we the participation level comes into play.
The revenue function is given by P : ∆ → R+ is the revenue function. A
deposit situation is the tuple (N,τ,∆,P,(m(i))i∈N). The set of all feasible port-
folios for an endowment vector m ∈ Rτ, which is still independent of allowing
diﬀerent levels of participation of the players, is given by
F(m) =
(





∀t ∈ {1,...,τ} :
X
δ∈∆






Recall that we have
f + g ∈ F(m1 + m2) (5)
for any two portfolios f ∈ F(m1) and g ∈ F(m2). The total capital at time





as before. Note that
Π(f) + Π(g) = Π(f + g) (6)
for any two portfolios f ∈ F(m1) and g ∈ F(m2).
In Van Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010), when consid-
ering coalitions and investigating the core of the corresponding deposit games,
the authors assumed that all players had two options: either they are part of a
coalition with their entire endowment, or they were not in the coalition at all.
However, since the endowment is capital, and hence divisible, it makes sense
to consider fractional players. In that situation, players can decide to join a
coalition with only a fraction of the capital available to them. This extension
has consequences for the notion of stability as well, since an allocation of the
revenue is only stable if no player has an incentive to participate with less than





The fact that we consider fuzzy coalitions is only reﬂected in the endowment.














This corresponds to the total capital at time τ + 1 minus the capital deposited
for a portfolio that is feasible for the endowment of that coalition. A fuzzy
19deposit game corresponding to a deposit situation (N,τ,∆,P,(m(i))i∈N) is v
as deﬁned in equation (7); a straightforward extension of the standard deposit
game with reinvestment.
Because deposit games do not have a non-empty core in general, since Van
Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010) provide a counterexample,
the same holds for fuzzy deposit games because the fuzzy core is even more
restrictive. Therefore we consider term dependent fuzzy deposit games. A
fuzzy deposit game is term dependent if the revenue function is called term
dependent, conform Van Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010).
Note that the revenue function and its term dependence are deﬁned in deposit
situations, not (fuzzy) deposit games.
Deﬁnition 28 A revenue function P : ∆ → R
τ+1
+ is called term dependent if
it holds for all t ∈ {1,...,τ + 1}, for all deposits δ ∈ ∆ and for all α > 0, that
Pt(αδ) = αPt(δ). If the underlying revenue function is term dependent, also the
corresponding fuzzy deposit game is called term dependent.
We need one more result that holds for any deposit situation, irrespective of
the corresponding deposit game being fuzzy or not. The next lemma from Van
Gulick, Borm, De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010) states that if we have a
feasible portfolio for some endowments, then if we scale these endowments the
portfolio that consists of the scaled deposits is feasible for the new problem, and
furthermore its revenue is also scaled in the same manner..
Lemma 29 Let m ∈ Rτ, f ∈ F(m) and λ > 0 and deﬁne g(λ · δ) = f(δ) for
all δ ∈ ∆. Then g ∈ F(λ · m) and Π(g) = λ · Π(f).
The next result and its proof are similar to the ones for regular term depedent
deposit games, now that we can apply Theorem 27.
Theorem 30 Every term dependent fuzzy deposit game has a non-empty core.
Proof: Let (N,v) be a fuzzy deposit game corresponding to a term dependent
deposit situation (N,τ,∆,P,(m(i))i∈N). We show that (N,v) satisﬁes all bal-
ancedness conditions. Take k ∈ N, λ1,λ2,...,λk > 0 and s1,s2,...,sk ∈ [0,1]N
such that
Pk























































































∀j ≤ k : fj ∈ F(m(sj))
)
.
































∀j ≤ k : fj ∈ F(λjm(sj))
)
.
If we apply equation (6) to the last expression, followed by (5) and (8), we see

















































Hence by Theorem 27 the core is non-empty. ￿
6 Conclusions
In a standard game coalitions between players are based on full cooperation.
When a player is in a coalition, he dedicates all his time and resources to that
coalition. This model can be extended when we allow the cooperation between
players also depends on the level of cooperation of the players. More speciﬁcally,
if the level of cooperation of the players is inﬁnitely divisible, we consider fuzzy
games. In this setting, the natural extension of the core of a game is in that
case the fuzzy core of the fuzzy game; no fraction of a player has any incentive
to split oﬀ from the grand coalition. In general, there are two ways to show
that the core of the game is non-empty: either one ﬁnds an element of the core,
21or one shows that all balanced inequalities are satisﬁed. We extend the latter
approach to the fuzzy core.
We show what balanced inequalities are if we consider fuzzy games, and
we show that if all balanced inequalities are satisﬁed, then the fuzzy game
has a non-empty fuzzy core. To provide insight in the mechanism used, and
in fuzzy games in general, we ﬁrst consider continuous fuzzy games. In these
games, a limit argument holds. We then prove the relationship for all fuzzy
games. Finally, we extend the deposit games introduced in Van Gulick, Borm,
De Waegenaere, and Hendrickx (2010) to fuzzy deposit games, and show that
the balanced inequalities can be used to show that the fuzzy core of these games
is non-empty if we assume term dependency.
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